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8.1  Introduction 
Recent political and economic events, such as the U.S.-Canada free-trade 
agreement and the generally increasing integration of world capital markets, 
have strengthened the already close ties between the economies of the United 
States and Canada. These close ties,  along with  the two countries’ shared 
cultural and economic characteristics, have provided researchers with good 
justification for using the experience of one country to draw inferences about 
the effects of potential policy changes in the other (e.g., Carroll and Summers 
1987). 
In  this paper, however, we  are concerned less with the lessons of  policy 
differences than with their potential spillover effects. In particular, we con- 
sider how demographics and fiscal structure are likely to interact over the next 
several decades in influencing each country’s rate of capital accumulation, and 
the implications of differences in projected saving with respect to patterns of 
trade and capital flows between the two countries. 
A U.S.-Canada comparison on this issue promises to be particularly inter- 
esting because the countries’ future demographic characteristics are projected 
to be quite different, and their fiscal systems for providing public expenditures 
for the elderly are also quite different. Moreover, the great difference in size 
between two countries should lead to very different macroeconomic effects of 
changes in national saving. Whereas increases in U.S. saving might signifi- 
cantly spur U.S. domestic investment through reduction in interest rates, the 
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relatively small size and the openness of the Canadian economy suggest that 
increases in Canadian national saving may have a smaller impact on domestic 
investment, but perhaps a greater relative impact on capital flows and the cur- 
rent account. 
Changes in population structure and fiscal policy are related in a very com- 
plex manner, and an accurate perspective on this relationship requires that one 
account for the general equilibrium effects of  significant policy changes. For 
example, demographic changes leading to a higher dependency ratio of  non- 
working to working population may also induce saving and labor supply re- 
sponses which, in turn, may affect capital-labor ratios and real wages, soften- 
ing  the  increase  in  tax  burden  required to  finance public  old-age support 
programs. To provide such general equilibrium analysis, we utilize the model 
presented in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and extended in Auerbach et al. 
(1989). 
In the next section, we review the model and how it will be applied to the 
current problem. Section 8.3 presents the data for the United States and Can- 
ada that are used to calibrate the model for the experiments we wish to con- 
sider, and section 8.4 presents the simulations of the model for the two coun- 
tries. 
8.2  Modeling a Demographic Bansition 
The model used in this paper is a numerical, general equilibrium simulation 
model of a single country, which we calibrate separately to study each coun- 
try. This is a modified version of the model used by Auerbach et al. (1989) in 
a related  comparison study of  the  demographic transitions in  four OECD 
countries-Japan,  Sweden, the United States, and West Germany. It contains 
three sectors: a household sector, a production sector, and a government sec- 
tor.  The optimal behavior of  each sector gives rise to nonlinear equations, 
which are combined to solve numerically for a perfect foresight transition path 
for the economy as a whole that is consistent with the behavior of individual 
agents. 
Among the features that distinguish this model from other general equilib- 
rium models  are its fully dynamic character, its  specification of  life-cycle 
household behavior, augmented to include bequests, and its explicit treatment 
of  family structure and demographics. As we  have described the model in 
some detail in our earlier work, we present only a brief review here, concen- 
trating  on the features of  the  model  that  are particularly relevant and the 
changes that have been made for the current investigation. 
8.2.1  Household Behavior 
At each date, the household sector comprises seventy-five overlapping gen- 
erations, corresponding to children aged 1 to 20 and adults aged 21 to 75. 
Each year all the 75-year-olds die (there being no uncertainty in the model), 257  Tax Aspects of Policy toward Aging Populations 
and new children are born. At  age 21, each individual changes status from 
child to adult and at the same time becomes the parent of a number of children 
determined exogenously by the model (but allowed to vary over different gen- 
erations). Each generation between ages 21  and 75 has a representative house- 
hold that consists of an adult and (for adults aged 21  to 41) that adult’s minor 
children. 
Each household maximizes an identical utility function of its lifetime con- 
sumption, labor supply, and bequests that is assumed to take the form: 
40 
N,  (1 + ti)-(’-*[)  ukj, + N,(1  + 8)-54ubr 
j=21 
where 6 is a pure rate of time preference, N, is the number of  children per 
parent, and upj,,  ukj,,  and ub,, are the instantaneous period utilities generated by 
parent’s consumption, children’s consumption, and the parent’s bequest per 
child, at age 75. The annual utility components, upjr  and ukj,,  are functions of 
contemporaneous consumption  and  leisure  assumed  to  have  the  constant 
elasticity-of-substitution form: 
(2) 
where cij,  and eij,  are, respectively, consumption and leisure of the generation t 
parent and this adult’s child at the parent’s agej. The term OL is a leisure share 
parameter, while p and y are, respectively, the intratemporal and intertemporal 
elasticities of  substitution.  In  the  model,  retirement  occurs  endogenously 
when an individual chooses to consume his entire labor endowment as leisure. 
The term oij  is a weighting parameter, meant to account for the smaller con- 
sumption needs of children. It is set equal to  1 for adults and grows linearly 
from .25 to .50 for children between the ages of 1 and 20. 
The utility of bequests term is assumed to take the form: 
(3) 
where b, is the bequest made to each child by adults in generation t and p is a 
preference parameter  indicating the  intensity  of  preferences for bequests. 
When p = 0, no bequests are left. 
Households maximize the utility function (1) subject to a budget constraint 
that the present value of the labor endowment of the adult (from age 21 to 75) 
and the child (from age 1 to 20), plus the adult’s inheritance (received at age 
55 from a dying parent), equal the consumption and leisure of the adult and 
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for productivity growth) grows from childhood through late adulthood and 
then falls, reflecting observed empirical patterns. 
The presence of government policy alters this budget constraint in several 
ways.  The model  includes proportional taxes on  labor income, capital in- 
come, and consumption, which affect the after-tax wage, interest rate, and 
price of consumption goods, respectively. These taxes are assumed to finance 
general expenditures that  do not directly influence the private decisions of 
households. 
In  addition, there  is  an autonomous social security system that finances 
public old-age pensions through a payroll tax. If  each individual’s pension 
were actuarially based on his own contributions, it would be  appropriate to 
view payroll taxes as forced saving, which (in our model without liquidity 
constraints) would not be perceived as “taxes” at all and would have no effect 
on the individual’s choices. However, in both the United States and Canada, 
public  pensions  are  only  imperfectly related  to  individual payroll  taxes. 
Hence, we assume that households consider a fraction A of all payroll taxes as 
if  they were ordinary taxes on labor income, treating the remaining payroll 
taxes and all benefits as if  they were simply lump-sum taxes and transfers, 
respectively. 
8.2.2  Firm Behavior 
The model has a single production sector that is assumed to behave com- 
petitively, using capital and labor subject to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb- 
Douglas production function with capital’s share of production (net of depre- 
ciation) equal to .25. Capital and labor are each homogeneous and assumed to 
be perfectly mobile within each country.’ We  assume that the economy expe- 
riences an exogenous, constant rate of technological change, set equal to l .5 
percent in all our simulations.* 
8.2.3  Government 
As already mentioned, we divide the government into two sectors: a public 
pension system financed by  payroll taxes, and a general sector financed by 
proportional taxes on labor income, capital income, and consumption. The 
model’s social security benefits are determined as a fraction of the average of 
wage-indexed labor earnings from age 21 through the social security age of 
1.  In the simulations for Canada, we also assume that capital can enter and leave the country 
freely. 
2. Introducing technological progress into a model with variable labor supply requires some 
care. The simplest approach of  assuming constant tastes and rising wage levels would lead to 
successive generations working more and more or less and less, depending on the value of  the 
intratemporal elasticity  p. To  avoid this problem,  we  allow each generation to experience the 
steeper wage profile implied by  technological progress, but interpret the rise in the overall wage 
profile experienced by  each generation  as if  it were time-augmenting,  and hence neutral with 
respect to the choice between market and nonmarket uses of labor. See Auerbach et al. (1989) for 
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retirement (which may differ from the  age of  true retirement). The wage- 
indexation procedure involves multiplying earnings in years prior to the social 
security retirement age by  the ratio of  the standardized wage at retirement, 
adjusted for the 1.5 percent rate of technological change, to the standardized 
wage in the past year in which earnings were received. 
Within the general government sector, we  distinguish four categories of 
spending. One category, meant to encompass items such as national defense, 
is assumed to be independent of the age structure of the population, growing 
at a rate equal to the sum of the population’s growth rate and the rate of tech- 
nological change. The other expenditure categories are those targeted at three 
age groups:  1  to 24, 25  to 64, and over 65. In our baseline simulations, we 
calculate the shares of total spending accounted for by  each type of targeted 
spending in 1985, and assume that thereafter the growth rates of each of these 
categories of  expenditure equals the rate of  technological progress plus the 
growth rate of  the relevant age group. Hence, overall government spending 
will grow more quickly as the population shifts to a category that receives 
more age-specific expenditures per capita. 
In addition to raising taxes and spending, the government is assumed to 
utilize public debt in financing its operations. The patterns of  spending and 
revenues for both the general and social security sectors of the government are 
required to satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint specifying that initial 
debt plus the present value of expenditures equal the present value of taxes. 
We  assume  that  debt  per  capita  is  constant  (normalized for  productivity 
growth) and use the  level of  debt as an initial condition in calibrating the 
model. 
8.2.4  Solution for Equilibrium 
Each country’s economy is assumed to be in a steady-state equilibrium in 
1960, at which time a demographic transition  begin^.^ We  study changes in 
government policy  and population structure that take place over the period 
1960-2050, after which time we impose the assumption that no further policy 
changes occur and birth rates are consistent with zero population growth. The 
economy is then allowed to converge to a new  steady state, for which  we 
allow an additional 160 years. Although the behavior of the economy during 
these later years is not of  particular interest or relevance, such future condi- 
tions must be incorporated into the model to accommodate our assumption 
that individuals during the first 90 years have perfect foresight with respect to 
the economy for the remainder of their own lifetimes, which may extend well 
beyond the year 2050. 
Since our model can only be solved for one country at a time, we approxi- 
3. While we are primarily interested in studying the behavior of the economies from the present 
onward, beginning the  simulations in  1960 permits  us to  analyze economies  that  are  already 
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mate a full, two-country  general equilibrium solution in the following way. 
We  solve first for the equilibrium path of the United States, treating it as a 
closed economy by imposing the constraint that national  saving equals na- 
tional investment. We  then take the implied U.S. interest rate for each year 
and assume that Canada is a small country that takes these (and hence the 
wage rate as well) as given.4 
This solution technique means that, in the model, current account imbal- 
ances do arise in the solution for Canada, but not for the United States. An- 
other consequence is that additional saving may raise domestic investment and 
raise real wages in the United States, but not in Canada. While this treatment 
is, of course, oversimplified,  it does bring out some of  the important conse- 
quences of the differences in size and openness of the two economies. 
8.3  Calibrating the Model 
For every simulation, projections begin in 1960 in order to produce condi- 
tions in the 1980s that actually prevailed, including the non-steady-state struc- 
ture of the population. For both countries, the model’s parameters are adjusted 
so that simulated household behavior patterns are realistic and aggregate var- 
iables match those actually observed during the period 1960-85.  The targeted 
variables are the rate of national saving, the social security contribution rate, 
the share of  government spending in  national income, and the tax rates on 
consumption, labor income, and capital income. 
8.3.1  Demographics 
While, in reality, demographic structure may change as the result of many 
factors (such as life expectancy, immigration, and age of  child-bearing), all 
changes in the model’s population age structure result from changes in birth 
rates. We choose the birth rates N,  for the years 1961-2050 in order to approx- 
imate, as closely as possible, values by decade of the age distribution of the 
population, based on OECD data. Table 8.1 provides historical age distribu- 
tions for 1960-1980  and projected  age distributions for 1990-2050  for the 
United States and Canada.* The table also presents the age distributions gen- 
erated by the birth rates used in our model simulations. 
The actual data show that Canada had a younger population in 1960, with 
33.7 percent of  the population below age 15 and 7.6 percent above age 65, 
compared to 31  .O percent and 9.2 percent, respectively, for the United States. 
However, by  1990, the population age structures had become more similar, 
with  Canada  still having  a slightly  smaller fraction  above age 65, but  the 
United States having a larger fraction under age  15. Both populations have 
4.  In assuming that Canadians face the U.S.  interest rate, before tax, we are essentially assum- 
ing that U.S. capital income taxes on Canadian investments are fully creditable against Canadian 
taxes, if Canadians are the marginal investors in the two countries. 
5.  The figures for 1990 are “projected’ in the sense that they were calculated in the late 1980s. 261  Tax Aspects of Policy toward Aging Populations 
Table 8.1  Population Age Distributions (percentage of population) 
Age Group 
Year  0-14  15-34  35-54  55-64  65 + 
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Table 8.1  (continued) 
Age Group 


































































aged considerably since 1960, with the fraction below age 15 dropping from 
about one-third to about one-fifth. 
Beyond 1990, the projections indicate a much more gradual demographic 
transition for the United States than for Canada. By the year 2000, Canada is 
predicted to have a larger fraction of its population in the over-65 category, as 
well as a smaller fraction younger than 15. The gap continues to widen for 
several more decades, until the age structures finally begin to converge again 
near the year 2050. 
As can be seen by  comparing the model’s age distributions to these actual 
population figures, the model’s assumed fertility patterns provide a reasonably 
good approximation of the projected demographic transitions in both coun- 
tries, at least if the age groups 55-64  and 65 + are combined.6 
8.3.2  Preference Parameters 
Several parameters must be  set in specifying household behavior: y,  the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution; p, the intratemporal elasticity of sub- 
stitution; a,  the leisure intensity parameter; 6,  the pure rate of discount; and 
p, the bequest intensity parameter. Following our past modeling work (Auer- 
bach et al.  1989), we set CI  =  1.5, p  = .8, and y  = .35. Because we are 
unaware of any evidence about the relative importance of bequests in the two 
countries, we use the same value of p for each country, 15,000,000.7  Finally, 
6. The tendency to understate the fraction of the population over 65 is due primarily to the 
model’s assumption that all individuals live exactly until age 75. In future work, we hope to relax 
this assumption. 
7. This value is consistent with the simultaneous achievement of realistic rates of  national sav- 
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we choose 6 to ensure that the 1960 national saving rates match actual national 
saving rates in each country. The resulting values are 6  = 0 for the United 
States and 6 = 0.006 for Canada.* This and fertility are the only differences 
between Canadian and U. S. households in our model, although government 
policies also contribute to differences in simulated household behavior. 
8.3.3  Fiscal Parameters 
In  1960, tax rates for each country on capital and labor income are set at 
historical values of the average rates of tax on these types of  income, accord- 
ing to the OECD Revenue  statistic^.^ We  do the same for consumption taxes, 
and choose the initial level of government debt to produce the 1960 share of 
government in GDP for each country.’O The values chosen cause national debt 
to equal 46 percent of  total private assets in Canada and 31 percent in the 
United States. After 1960, the level of public debt per capita is kept constant. 
Between 1960 and 1985, income tax rates are kept at their historical levels, 
while we adjust the growth rate of  government spending (measured net of the 
rate of growth of population plus total factor productivity) to ensure that the 
remaining general fiscal instrument, the consumption tax rate, also follows 
the appropriate trend between 1960 and 1985. After 1985, income tax rates 
are kept constant at their 1985 values, and the consumption tax rate serves as 
the marginal sources of  funds, being adjusted to maintain balance between 
government spending and interest service and other tax revenues.  l1 
Although the normal age of initial public pension receipt is 65 in both coun- 
tries, the systems and their funding differ considerably. In the United States, 
the primary function of the Social Security system historically has been the 
provision of  old-age and survivors’ pension insurance (OASI). It also pro- 
vides disability insurance (DI) and  a growing health insurance (HI) com- 
ponent, Medicare. At the same time, the primary source of revenue for the 
OASDHI system, and the sole source of revenue for the pension component, 
has been the payroll tax. 
In Canada, however, the association of the payroll tax and the old-age pub- 
lic pension scheme has been much weaker. The payroll tax has traditionally 
8. The slightly higher rate of discount for Canada arises because Canada’s lower rate of govern- 
ment absorption of GDP and its greater emphasis on consumption taxes would otherwise lead (in 
our model) to a higher rate of national saving, while the rates in 1960 for the two countries were 
actually quite similar. 
9. OECD revenue statistics for Canada begin only in 1965, so we extrapolate values for 1960. 
The use of average tax rates is consistent with the model’s specification of proportional tax rates, 
which does not allow us to incorporate tax progressivity and the more complicated elements of 
capital income taxation in the two countries.  In particular, we do not incorporate the incentive 
effects of sheltered savings plans such as IRAs in the United States and RRSPs in Canada. 
10. Since the interest rate exceeds the growth rate in our simulations, a higher level of debt per 
capita leads to a lower level of government spending, given taxes. 
11. We  use the consumption tax as the marginal source of funds in each country for the sake of 
comparison. Knowing how the tax structure would actually respond to changes in revenue needs 
would depend on a variety of factors, including the types of expenditures being increased and the 
level of government (e.g., federal vs. state or provincial) making the expenditures and raising the 
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funded a wider range of  social insurance spending, such as unemployment 
compensation (funded by  employer payments in  the United  States), while 
most funding of public old-age pensions has been through general revenues. 
The Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (CPP/QPP), like the OASI system in 
the United States,  are financed by  payroll taxes, with benefits loosely and 
indirectly related to past contributions. Older Canadians also receive demo- 
grants,  called Old Age  Security (OAS) payments,  and  many  also receive 
Guaranteed Income Supplements; both systems are financed by general reve- 
nues. According to Musgrave et al. (1987), OAS payments were nearly twice 
as large, in the aggregate, as CPP/QPP payments in 1984. 
We  accommodate these important institutional differences by making two 
adjustments to each country's data so that they conform more closely to the 
structure of our model. The social security system we simulate is funded ex- 
clusively by  payroll taxes and provides only old-age pension benefits. One 
data adjustment, discussed more fully below, is to include in general spending 
(rather than pension spending) the part of  public pension  spending that is 
funded by general revenues. Also, since all nonpension spending is excluded 
from  our  model's  social  security system  and  included  instead  in  general 
spending, we reduce the measured payroll tax in each country to account for 
the nonpension spending financed by payroll taxes, increasing labor income 
taxes over their historical values by  the same amount as we reduce payroll 
taxes.'* The resulting adjusted values of labor income taxes and payroll taxes 
are shown (for 1960 and 1985) in table 8.2 along with the values of capital 
income taxes and consumption taxes calculated from the OECD revenue data. 
General (nonpension) government spending is divided into four categories: 
age-specific spending on the young (f,), middle-aged (f,)  and old (f,),  and 
non-age-specific spending (f"),  with  = 1. To determine these shares, we 
follow the following procedure. Using unpublished OECD data for 1985 on 
the levels of  government expenditure on education, family benefits, health, 
and unemployment compensation directed to each age group in each country, 
we form an estimate of the fraction of nonpension, age-specific expenditures 
going to each age group.I3  We  then use published data on all nonpension gov- 
ernment spending (net of  interest payments) for the same year to derive the 
fraction of all spending that is in these age-specific categories, and multiply 
this fraction by  the fractions of  age-specific spending on the young, middle- 
aged, and old, to arrive at the fractionsi. Finally, we adjust the calculation by 
adding to age-specific spending on the old those public pension benefits that 
are funded by general revenues, rather than by the payroll tax. 
12. For the United States, we use the adjustment made by Auerbach et al. (1989) using unpub- 
lished OECD data. For Canada, we use an estimate that one-third of all payroll taxes were CPP/ 
QPP contributions from  1966-85,  based on the number cited in Musgrave et al. (1987).  From 
1960-65,  before the advent of these plans, we assume all payroll taxes were for nonpension 
expenditures. 
13. We used 1980 as a base year for the United States in Auerbach et al. (1989), and use these 
calculations of U.S. government expenditures here, rather than redoing all the calculations for 
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Table 8.2  Tax Rates for 1960 and 1985 
United States  Canada 
Tax  1960  1985  1960  1985 
Wage  19.2  18.7  11.3  21.4 
Capital Income  16.2  15.7  10.0  16.6 
Social Security  7.1  7.6  0.0  2.4 
Consumption  9.8  9.7  21 .o  22.2 
Thus, our social security system for each country accounts only for that 
part of  old-age pensions financed by payroll taxes; all nonpension social in- 
surance spending and all payroll taxes financing nonpension spending are con- 
sistently accounted for in the general government budget calculations. 
Based on our calculations, the government spending sharesi for the United 
States are .291 (young), .060 (middle-aged), .071 (old) and  .578 (non-age- 
specific). The corresponding shares for Canada are  .306,  .172,  .141, and 
.38  1. Since the age distributions in the two countries were fairly similar in the 
1980s, one can attribute the differences between the two countries primarily 
to differences in underlying policy. In Canada, relative to the United States, a 
much greater share of  government spending (excluding payroll-tax-financed 
pension  benefits)  is  targeted toward  the  middle-aged and the elderly.  The 
larger old-age component in Canada is primarily attributable to the large frac- 
tion of pension benefits financed by general revenues. The larger middle-aged 
component is due to the higher levels of spending per capita on health benefits 
(for non-aged adults) and unemployment compensation. 
Because the public pension scheme that remains is fully financed by payroll 
taxes, its characteristics are similar for the two countries. We set the parameter 
A, corresponding to the fraction of payroll taxes actually perceived to be taxes 
rather than contributions, to .5 for both countries. 
8.4  Simulation Results 
Our simulations for the United States are quite similar to those presented in 
Auerbach et al. (1989).14  For both countries, we begin by calibrating the ini- 
tial steady states to match the 1960 shares of national saving and government 
spending in national income (GDP less depreciation), using as tools the pure 
rate of  time preference 6 and the level of  initial public debt. This procedure 
produces realistic values for both countries: national saving rates of approxi- 
14. They differ primarily in two ways. First, we have introduced the term A, representing the 
fraction of  Social Security pension contributions viewed as taxes. Previously, we implicitly set 
this term equal to zero. Second, we have chosen to calibrate government spending so that govern- 
ment’s share of output corresponds to the value actually observed in  1960. This leads to an in- 
crease in  private saving (via a lower assumed pure rate of  time preference) and a reduction in 
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mately  10 percent  for both the United  States and Canada, and government 
shares of 20.4 percent of national income in the United States and  17.5 per- 
cent in Canada. For each country, all simulations presented  share the same 
initial steady state. 
8.4.1  Baseline Simulations 
After fixing the initial 1960 steady states, we then run trial transition simu- 
lations to choose a base case rate of growth of per-capita government spending 
that, given the assumed tax rates on labor and capital income (in table 8.2) 
and the level of  per-capita  government  debt established  in the initial steady 
state, provides  a consumption tax in  1985 that is consistent  with the actual 
observed  va1~e.l~  The results for the  base case simulations  for the  United 
States and Canada are given in table 8.3. For each country, we present simu- 
lated values of several variables for the years  1960 (the initial steady state), 
1985, 1990, 2010, 2030, 2050, and the “long run” (the final steady state with 
zero population growth). 
The consumption and social security taxes for 1960 and 1985 may be com- 
pared to the actual values given in table 8.2, which are closely approximated 
by the simulations. Table 8.3 also presents for each year the national saving 
rate (national income less private and public spending as a share of national 
income), the real, detrended after-tax  wage  rate,I6 and the current account 
(relative to national  income), which  is constrained  to be zero in the closed 
economy simulations for the United States. 
As we already have discussed, the simulations are constrained to conform 
to fiscal measures in both  1960 and  1985, and to the aggregate national in- 
come shares of  saving and government in  1960. After  1960, there is nothing 
to guarantee that simulated saving rates will conform closely to historical lev- 
els, and indeed the simulated patterns for both countries diverge from actual 
experience. 
The model predicts  a decline in saving for Canada and an increase in the 
United States between  1960 and  1990, a pattern that is precisely opposite to 
that which actually occurred. The actual Canadian saving rate was 12.3 per- 
cent  in  1985, and just 3.6 percent  in  the  United   state^.'^  These divergent 
trends in saving behavior over the past few decades have provoked some at- 
15. This requires a U.S.  government growth rate of 0.5% per capita, and a Canadian one of 
2.6%. Although government’s share of income did grow more quickly in Canada, these growth 
rates understate the actual rate of  growth in  the United States and overstate the actual rate  of 
growth in  Canada. The differences are due to the fact that our model does not account for all 
components of the government budget. 
16. The formula for this variable is [w, .  (I -  7,-  A.0,)  / (1 ++,)I  /  1.015‘, where w, is the wage 
rate at date t. T,,  O,, and 4, are the wage tax rate, the social security tax rate, and the consumption 
tax rate, respectively, and A is the fraction of the social security tax perceived to be a tax, equal to 
.5  in all the simulations presented here. 
17. Although since  1985 the U.S. saving rate has risen somewhat and the Canadian rate has 
fallen, a gap remains between the two. 267  Tax Aspects of Policy toward Aging Populations 
Table 8.3  Base Case Simulations 




































Consumption Tax Rate 
9.8  21.0 
8.3  21.8 
8.6  19.5 
5.7  14.3 
5.8  17.5 
5.5  17.6 
5.3  17.1 
Social Security Tax Rate 
7.1  0.0 
7.6  2.4 
8.0  2.5 
10.2  3.6 
12.8  5.3 
12.8  4.7 
12.3  4.1 
National Saving Ratea 
10.1  9.8 
12.2  8.1 
11.7  8.9 
9.5  9.1 
6.5  3.3 
5.8  2.1 
6.3  5.0 
Real After-Tax Wageb 
.70  .73 
.74  .65 
.74  .67 
.78  .78 
.78  .72 
.79  .72 
.79  .67 
Current Account” 
0  -1.5 
0  -5.0 
0  -4.1 
0  1.6 
0  0.9 
0  -3.3 
0  -  1.3 
‘Saving rate and current account expressed as fractions of  national income. 
bReal wage is detrended and is net of  wage tax, consumption tax, and half of social security tax. 268  Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
tempts at explanation (e.g., Carroll and Summers 1987). In our own empirical 
analysis of  the  United  States,  based  on  microeconomic consumption  data 
(Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  1990),  we  confirmed  that  demographic factors 
should have led U.S. saving to increase between 1960 and 1985; we encoun- 
tered considerable difficulty identifying other factors (including fiscal policy) 
that could explain the observed decline. 
While we  could induce the model to track actual saving behavior in each 
country more closely, for example by changing taste parameters over time, we 
believe that to do this is unwarranted, in light of  the scant evidence on the 
subject. Instead, we present the simulations based on constant preferences and 
emphasize the changes in rates of  saving over time associated with demo- 
graphic factors, rather than the saving rate levels themselves. 
Certain patterns associated with the shift to an older population are observ- 
able in both countries’ baseline simulations. Both countries experience a de- 
cline in needed consumption taxes after 1985, although the rate rises again in 
Canada. These patterns result from the interaction of several factors. First, in 
each country, as the population ages, consumption per capita rises, reducing 
the required consumption tax rate. This is particularly significant in Canada, 
which depends more on consumption taxes than the United States does. On 
the other hand, the old receive more government spending per capita, so the 
amount of revenue required is increased, particularly in Canada. Finally, the 
timing of  the demographic transition differs across the two countries. Cana- 
da’s shift occurs earlier and more  sharply; it  leads to an earlier decline in 
consumption taxes, but also to a stronger reversal of the initial effect. 
This difference in timing is also apparent in the predicted pattern of social 
security tax rates. These tax rates rise in both countries as the ratio of retired 
population to working population increases. However, the  U.S. tax rate  is 
roughly constant at its peak level of  12.8 percent over the period 2030-50, 
not declining until later. In contrast, the Canadian tax rate peaks in 2030 and 
has already begun declining to its long-run value by  2050, when the ratio of 
retired to working population has already begun to decline from its peak value 
associated with the retirement of the baby boom generation. 
The relatively larger and more rapid Canadian demographic transition also 
influences the predicted pattern of national saving over the next 60 years. The 
simulations predict that the U.S. saving rate will decline steadily through the 
year 2050, with the most significant drop during the period  1990-2030.  In 
Canada, however, the saving rate is projected to rise slightly until 2010, but 
then drop much more sharply than in the United States. This difference is 
easily understood  in terms  of  the changing fractions of  the population  of 
young, old, and middle-aged in each country. 
One may simplify things a bit by thinking of the young and old as dissavers 
and the middle-aged as savers. A demographic shift toward an older popula- 
tion has offsetting effects, then, as the population share of the young declines 
but that of the old rises. In Canada, beginning with a much younger popula- 269  Tax Aspects of Policy toward Aging Populations 
tion than the United States, the first effect dominates initially. However, Can- 
ada’s sharper birth-rate change ultimately leads to a larger increase in the 
share of the elderly in the population, causing a sharper decline in the saving 
rate. 
Many who have considered the coming demographic transition have em- 
phasized the potential fiscal burden associated with the increasing dependency 
ratio. We have found here that social security tax rates will rise in each coun- 
try.  However, there are other factors that act to counterbalance this burden. 
First, as we have already discussed, general expenditures per capita will rise, 
but so may  tax bases.  Second, as the population ages, one may expect an 
increase in capital-labor ratios and hence a rise in real wages. In the simula- 
tions presented, the real U.S. wage rate (normalized for trend growth) rises by 
over 8 percent between 1985 and 2050. By assumption, the same growth in 
real wages is experienced in Canada. 
One way of combining these factors is in terms of the real, after-tax wage 
rate  (relative to  trend),  which,  beginning  in  1985, rises in both countries 
through the year 2010. It then levels off in the United States, but falls in Can- 
ada, as the consumption tax rises once again. However, even in Canada, the 
real after-tax wage rate in 2050 is predicted to be higher than it was in 1985. 
The last set of  numbers given in table  8.3 is for the current account in 
Canada, which we have assumed in these simulations to be a small open econ- 
omy that takes its factor returns from the United States. One must recognize 
that this polar open economy assumption, with no adjustment costs to trade or 
capital flows and assets being perfect substitutes across national borders, can 
give rise to large and volatile annual measures of the current account surplus 
or deficit. Taking this into account, the predicted current account balances in 
the table provide an interesting picture of  the influence of  the demographic 
transition on trade and capital flows. 
The model predicts a Canadian current account deficit of  1.5 percent of 
national income in 1960, higher than the actual deficit of about .4 percent. It 
then swings away from reality, predicting an increase to a 5.0 percent deficit 
in 1985, when there was actually a surplus of 2.7 percent. The error is clearly 
associated with the model’s significant underprediction of the 1985 Canadian 
national saving rate; once again, future patterns are more useful in predicting 
changes than levels. The model predicts that the Canadian current account 
will swing strongly toward surplus from the present until around 2010, after 
which, with the saving rate declining, Canada will move again toward a deficit 
position. 
8.4.2  Alternative Simulations 
In this section, we consider the effects of alternative dynamic fiscal policies 
on the transition paths for the United States and Canada. Table 8.4 presents 
the alternative U.S. simulations, while those for Canada appear in table 8.5. 
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Table 8.4  Alternative Simulations: United States 
Increase in 
No Spending  Retirement 



















Consumption Tax Rate 
8.3  8.3  8.2 
8.6  8.6  8.4 
5.1  5.5  5.2 
5.8  5.2  4.9 
5.5  4.8  4.5 
5.3  4.6  4.1 
Social Security Tax Rate 
7.6  1.6  1.5 
8.0  7.9  1.9 
10.2  10.2  8.0 
12.8  12.8  10.2 
12.8  12.8  10.1 
12.3  12.3  9.9 
National Saving Rate 
12.2  12.2  12.4 
11.7  11.7  12.0 
9.5  9.4  10.1 
6.5  6.6  1.2 
5.8  5.9  6.3 
6.3  6.3  6.6 
from table 8.3. Since all simulations are the same in 1960, we do not report 
the results for that year. Likewise, we focus our attention on three of  the vari- 
ables reported in table 8.3, the consumption tax rate, the social security tax 
rate, and the national saving rate. 
The first set of  alternative simulations, given in the second columns of 
tables 8.4 and 8.5, imposes a different assumption about the response of  gen- 
eral government spending to a change in the age structure of the population. 
Previously, we assumed that age-specific spending stayed constant (except for 
trend productivity growth) per member of the relevant age group. As the pop- 
ulations shift toward those groups to which more spending is targeted (the 
young and the elderly), this leads to an overall rise in government spending 
relative to the population as a whole. As we have defined it, to include public 
pension payments financed by general revenues, the Canadian general public 
sector has a considerably larger fraction of  its spending targeted toward the 
elderly. This helps explain the rise in the required consumption tax rate in 
Canada after 2010 in the baseline simulation. 
In the alternative simulations labeled “No Spending Rise,” we  assume in- 271  Tax Aspects of  Policy toward Aging Populations 
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Table 8.5  Alternative Simulations: Canada 
Increase in  Initial 
No Spending  Retirement  Rise in 
Year  Base Case  Rise  Age  Benefits 







21.8  21.9  21.8  22.0 
19.5  19.5  19.5  19.9 
14.3  12.5  14.2  15.2 
17.5  12.1  17.2  18.7 
17.6  13.1  17.4  18.8 
17.1  13.6  16.9  18.2 







~  ~~  ~~  ~  ~ 
2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4 
2.5  2.5  2.5  3.1 
3.6  3.6  2.8  6.1 
5.3  5.3  4.4  9.1 
4.7  4.7  3.8  7.9 
4. I  4.1  3.3  7.0 







8. I  7.8  8.2  7.4 
8.9  8.5  9.0  8.1 
9.1  8.8  9.4  8.0 
3.3  4.1  3.6  2.0 
2.1  2.5  2.4  1.3 
5.0  5.1  5.1  4.2 
stead that all general government spending remains constant per member of 
the overall population, not per member of  the affected age group. Implicitly, 
this  assumes  that  age-specific spending per  capita  is  reduced  as  benefit- 
intensive age groups become more important components of  the population. 
The results of  these simulations confirm that this alternative fiscal-policy as- 
sumption leads to lower spending and hence to lower required consumption 
tax rates. Also as expected, the effect is considerably larger for Canada. While 
the U.S. consumption tax is reduced by  as much as .7 percentage points (in 
2050 and the long run), the Canadian consumption tax is reduced by 5.4 per- 
centage points in 2030 and 3.5 percentage points in the long run. This reduc- 
tion in Canada, unlike the much smaller one simulated for the United States, 
is important enough to influence the national saving rate, which is .8 percent- 
age points higher in 2030.18 
The next set of simulations, presented in the third columns of tables 8.4  and 
18. It is lower in earlier years, such as 1990 and 2010, because individuals feel wealthier and 
hence spend more, knowing that government taxes will be lower in the future. 272  Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
8.5, considers the impact of a gradual, announced increase in the retirement 
age, modeled after the one currently in process in the United States. The sim- 
ulations assume that the retirement age rises from 65 to 66 in the year 2000 
and from 66 to 67 in the year 2010, remaining constant thereafter. These ex- 
periments have an obvious impact on the social security tax rates in each coun- 
try. In the United States, the tax rate peaks at 10.2 percent in 2030, rather than 
12.8 percent.  In Canada, the tax rate peaks  at 4.4 percent rather than 5.3 
percent, also in 2030. In both countries, this leads to a higher rate of saving. 
Given the nature of pay-as-you-go social security systems and our life-cycle 
model, such an increase is to be expected; individuals must save more for their 
own retirement. In the United States, the saving rate rises by as much as .7 
percentage points (in 2030),  and  .3 percentage points in  the long run. The 
respective numbers for Canada are .3 (also in 2030) and .  1  ,  smaller because 
of the smaller size of the payroll-tax-financed portion of public pensions. 
Our final simulation,  which we present for Canada, is motivated by  the 
recent relative trends in payroll tax rates and benefit levels. Unlike the U.S. 
system, the Canadian public pension  system is relatively young.  Immature 
pension schemes operating on a pay-as-you-go basis initially run surpluses, 
as few individuals are eligible to receive benefits in the early years of opera- 
tion. Once the pension plan has been in place for enough years for the retired 
population to be eligible for full benefits, one gets a truer picture of whether 
promised benefit levels can be sustained by payroll taxes. 
In Canada, expenditures on benefits were less than the pension contribution 
component of  payroll taxes until about  1985. By the year 2000, benefit ex- 
penditures are projected to rise to a level about 70 percent higher than pension 
contributions, suggesting that the payroll tax rate will have to rise in the near 
future (Musgrave et al. 1987, p. 668). Our model sets the payroll tax rate at 
the level needed to pay for current benefits and maintain system budget bal- 
ance on a cash-flow basis. Therefore, we simulate this projected rise in the 
payroll tax by  letting the social security replacement  rate,  which was held 
constant  in  the previous  simulations, rise gradually by  70 percent over the 
period 1985-2000,  remaining constant thereafter. 
The results of this simulation are given in the last column of table 8.5. The 
payroll tax rate rises to a peak of 9.1 percent in 2030, instead of 5.3 percent, 
making the level of the Canadian tax rate much closer to that of the United 
States. Note that this tax increase is slightly higher than 70 percent, since the 
increased tax rate does reduce labor supply somewhat. For the same reason, 
the levels of consumption taxation must be higher than in the baseline simu- 
lation, by about 1.2 percentage points in 2030 and thereafter. 
The higher level of benefits in this simulation leads to a lower level of na- 
tional saving as well. Since benefits as currently scheduled appear to require 
a considerable increase in payroll taxes, the benefit levels in our baseline sim- 
ulations are much lower than those currently planned. Hence, the alternative 
simulation  amounts to an  increase  in  benefit levels relative to the baseline 
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The simulated effect of  this  increase on  national saving is considerable, 
depressing the saving rate by as much as 1.3 percentage points in 2030 and .8 
percentage points in the long run. This effect is several times larger in magni- 
tude than the increase in saving that we project for a gradual increase in the 
retirement age. 
8.5  Conclusions 
Our analysis indicates that demographic transitions are likely to have sig- 
nificant effects on rates of  saving and taxation in both the'united States and 
Canada. These two countries and their fiscal systems differ in several ways, 
which we have tried to incorporate into our analysis. 
Canada's economy differs from that of  the United  States in being much 
smaller, relying more heavily on consumption taxes to finance public spend- 
ing, and financing much of  its public old-age pensions out of general reve- 
nues. Moreover, the relative immaturity of the pay-as-you-go part of Canada's 
pension scheme suggests that, even without a demographic transition, a con- 
siderable rise in payroll taxes may be required. Combined with the sharper 
demographic transition that is projected for Canada, these fiscal differences 
lead us to predict a later and more severe drop in the national saving rate in 
Canada, with potentially a much greater increase in the payroll tax as well. 
As our real wage calculations indicate, one should not necessarily infer that 
lower national saving reduces welfare. Tax increases may be more than offset 
by rising real wages. Ultimate judgments about changes in welfare really re- 
quire a fuller treatment of why these demographic transitions are occurring, 
in these two countries and in most other highly developed countries as well. 
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